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One may affirm that what is 'really valuable' is better than what is not really valuable. If this means that what is valuable is better than what is not valuable, or that any good is better than none

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Or, one may affirm that what is 'really better' is better than what is not really better. If this means that what is in fact better, is better than what is not better, it reduces either to the statement that some value is better than none; or to the principle, applicable to all orders of magnitude, that whatever is greater than any given quantity b is greater than any second quantity a whose magnitude is either less than, or the same as, that of b. The use of the term 'reality' in this connection only obscures the principles really involved.

The terms 'real' and 'really' may, however, be used to mean 'true' or 'truly' and so construed they introduce a new consideration. The statement that the true good is better than the apparent or false good, or that the 'truly better' is better than the seemingly better, involves a reference to the role of judgment in value, and has to be interpreted in the light of the duality of this role. The truly good or better may mean that which is judged truly to be good or better. In this case the truth or falsity in question qualifies a judgment of value, absolute or comparative. But since the judgment that b is good, or better than a, is true when b is good or better than a, the truth of value in this sense reduces to reality as considered above. The truly, as distinguished from the seemingly, good or better may, however, mean that which is liked, desired or preferred in the light of knowledge, as distinguished from what is liked, desired or preferred in the darkness of ignorance and error; where the truth or falsity in question qualifies the mediating judgments on which the interest or preference is founded. An object which is good because of the favorable interest taken in it, may thus be said to be 'truly good' when this interest is founded on true judgments, or 'falsely good' when founded on false judgments; and the same analysts will apply to the truly or falsely bad, or the truly or falsely better and worse. Whether the truly good in this sense can properly be said to be better than the falsely good, depends on whether judging an object truly does in itself confer value on that object...

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The task of a general theory of value can be further defined as the task of rendering commensurable the diverse and irrelevant critical judgments of every-day life. A general concept of value is indispensable if we are to disengage a generic idea or principle from the overwhelming variety and confusion of our world of praise and disparagement. Consider, for example, some of the various ways in which a single object, such as a book, may be praised or disparaged. First, it may be condemned as ignorant by one who is thinking of the author's intellectual incompetence; or second, as mendacious by one who is thinking of the author's intent to deceive, Third, it may be deemed lawful by one who is thinking of regulations governing the circulation of obscene, revolutionary or libelous publications. Fourth, it may be disparaged as cheap by one who is thinking of the little one could get for it; or, fifth, as crude or in bad taste by one who is thinking of its binding or style. Sixth, it may be praised as edifying by one who is thinking of its effect on the reader's piety. These various properties 'ignorant,' 'mendacious,' 'lawful,' 'cheap,' 'crude,' and 'edifying,' differ characteristically as a group, from such other properties as the book's color, weight, and size. They are the terms in which the book may be estimated, the predicates of the critical judgments that may be pronounced upon it. We need the term 'value' as a term to apply to all the predicates of this group. We may then speak of the book's cognitive value, its moral value, its political value, its economic value, its aesthetic value and its religious value as various species of one genus.

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If theory of value, through the wide and thorough inclusiveness of its initial inventory, aggravates rather than cures the multiplicity of values, this is only from hope of arriving at a system that shall fit the data, in place of a system based on bias or tradition. The very generalization of the concept of value implies that some common character pervades all special values; and it is hoped that when this common character or principle is laid bare, it may be seen to generate the special values as its legitimate progeny. But a general theory of value undertakes to do more than reduce all values to a common descriptive denominator, or attach them to a common family tree. It undertakes also to render them in some sense commensurable. It undertakes to provide a rational ground for judgments of comparative value; and in particular for those ultimate judgments in which man estimates his civilization, his progress, or the salvation of his soul.